Themes in the Economics of Aging by Michael D. Hurd et al.
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Themes in the Economics of Aging
Volume Author/Editor: David A. Wise, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-90284-6
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/wise01-1
Publication Date: January 2001
Chapter Title: Predictors of Mortality among the Elderly
Chapter Author: Michael D. Hurd, Daniel McFadden, Angela Merrill
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10325
Chapter pages in book: (p. 171 - 198)
5
Predictors of Mortality among
the Elderly
Michael D. Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and
Angela Merrill
5.1 Introduction
Mortality risk is a fundamental determinant of consumption and saving
in a life-cycle model. Understanding the behavioral reactions to variation
in mortality risk is important from a scientiﬁc point of view and from a
policy point of view. The reaction will reveal the degree of risk aversion,
whichi sa ni mportant behavioral parameter. The economic status of the
oldest old will depend on their consumption and saving choices in the
years closely following retirement. Under the life-cycle model, the pre-
dicted changes in life expectancy will have an eﬀect on national saving
beyond what would be forecast from a compositional eﬀect.
Mortality risk in the population may be adequately measured by life-
tables; however, individuals are likely to have additional information about
their life chances and use that information in making consumption and
saving decisions. Some of that information may be related to observable
characteristics such as health status and socioeconomic status (SES). Ac-
counting for the relationship between SES and mortality (the SES gradi-
ent) is particularly important. The gradient is important because it causes
diﬃculties in predicting the economic status of a cohort and in under-
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171standing life-cycle behavior from cross-sectional variation in wealth. Be-
sides cohort eﬀects that would, by themselves, cause wealth to decline with
agei nc ross-section, the mortality gradient will cause wealth to increase
both in cross-section and in panel. As a cohort ages those with less wealth
die, leaving survivors from the upper part of the wealth distribution. Thus,
eveni fn oc o uple or single person dissaves after retirement, the wealth of
the cohort would increase with age. This makes it diﬃcult to study life-
cycle wealth paths based on synthetic cohorts, which will eliminate cohort
diﬀerences in lifetime time resources but not diﬀerential mortality. These
diﬃculties carry over to studies of income and consumption in synthetic
cohorts.
Yeti ti slikely that individuals have subjective information about their
own survival chances that cannot be discovered from mortality rates stra-
tiﬁed by observable covariates such as SES. First, some personal charac-
teristics are not easily measured, so they cannot be used as stratifying
variables. Second, individuals may misperceive their survival chances,
choosing consumption based on subjective yet biased life expectancy. If
we aret ou n derstand consumption choices we need to have observations
on the subjective variables that individuals use in making their choices.
Third, even if we could stratify by many characteristics and understand
average bias, there surely would remain considerable heterogeneity in sub-
jective survival probabilities: Understanding that heterogeneity would
help in the estimation of life-cycle models.
To model and use heterogeneous information about survival chances in
life-cycle models is a multistep process. First, we need to ﬁnd the observ-
able correlates of mortality and measure their eﬀects. Second, we need to
measure the perceptions of individuals about their own mortality risk,
and, given observable characteristics, to ﬁnd if these perceptions have ex-
planatory power for mortality. Third, we need measures of mortality risk
that embody all of our knowledge about heterogeneity in models of deci-
sion making. This paper addresses the ﬁrst two of these steps.
Diﬀerential mortality by SES has been observed overawide range of
data and populations: Mortality rates are high among those from lower
SES groups (Kitagawa and Hauser 1973; Shorrocks 1975; Hurd 1987;
Hurd and Wise 1989; Jianakoplos Menchik and Irvine 1989; Feinstein
1992). However, because of data limitations the measures of SES have
typically been occupation or education. In the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) and the Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old
(AHEAD) study there is scope for expanded studies of diﬀerential mortal-
ityb ecause these are panel surveys with considerable age density and they
obtain extensive data on income, wealth, and health conditions in addition
to occupation and education. The AHEAD data in particular oﬀer oppor-
tunities for increasing our knowledge of the gradient because the popula-
tion (aged seventy or over at baseline) has not been studied to the extent
to which younger populations have been. Furthermore, the fact that the
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confounding eﬀecto fh e alth on income via work status is practically elimi-
nated. Finally, almost the entire AHEAD population is covered by Medi-
care:T herefore, an important causal pathway linking SES to mortality via
access to health care services is reduced and even possibly eliminated.
The HRS and AHEAD asked each respondent to give an estimate of
his or her chances of surviving to a target age, which was approximately
twelve years in the future. In the HRS this variable is a signiﬁcant predic-
toro fm o rtality between waves 1 and 2 (Hurd and McGarry forthcoming).
Here we aim to ﬁnd if it has predictive power for mortality in the AHEAD
population both unconditionally and conditionally on observable charac-
teristics.
In this paper we will verify that SES is related to mortality in the
AHEAD data. Then we will give evidence about the validity of the subjec-
tive survival probabilities. The evidence will be of three kinds: whether
the subjective survival probabilities vary in cross-section in a way that is
appropriate given the variation in actual mortality; how the subjective sur-
vival probabilities change in panel in response to new information such as
the onset of an illness; and whether they predict actual mortality. We will
then examine whether, conditional on health status and SES, the subjective
survival probabilities have explanatory power for predicting mortality.
5.2 Data
Our data come from the AHEAD study (see Soldo et al. 1997), a bien-
nial panel survey of individuals born in 1923 or earlier and their spouses.
At baseline in 1993 it surveyed 8,222 individuals representative of the
community-based population except for oversamples of blacks, Hispanics,
and Floridians. Wave 2 was ﬁelded in 1995.
The main goal of AHEAD is to provide panel data from the three broad
domains of economic status, health, and family connections. Our main
interest in this paper is to understand the predictors of mortality between
waves1and 2, especially education, income, wealth, and the subjective
probability of survival. In wave 1, individuals and couples were asked for
ac omplete inventory of assets and debts and about income sources.
Through the use of unfolding brackets, nonresponse to asset values was
reduced to levels much lower than would be found in a typical household
survey such as the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).1
Both HRS and AHEAD have innovative questions about subjective
1. To handle nonresponse to asset and total income questions, we use a nested composite
imputation procedure. We impute nonresponse to asset ownership, unfolding brackets, and
asset amounts sequentially. Ownership and complete brackets are imputed using stepwise
logistic regression on a number of demographic characteristics. Dollar amounts are then
imputed, conditional on a complete bracket, using a nearest neighbor which makes extensive
use of covariates (Hoynes, Hurd, and Chand. 1998).
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events. We will use observations on the subjective probability of survival.
The formo ft h eq u e s t i o nis as follows:
[Using any] number from 0 to 100 where “0” means that you think there
is absolutely no chance and “100” means that you think the event is
absolutely sure to happen . . . [w]hat do you think are the chances that
you will live to be at least A?
A is the target age. A is 80, 85, 90, 95, or 100 if the age of the respondent
was less than 70, 70–74, 75–79, 80–84, or 85–89, respectively. The question
was not asked of those aged 90 or over or of proxy respondents.
AHEAD queries about a wide range of health conditions. Many are
asked of the respondent in the following form: “Has a doctor ever told you
that you have . . . ?” We will use information on ten conditions such as
cancer, heart attack/disease, and lung disease. The respondent is queried
about limitations to activities of daily living (ADL). We will use as an
indicator of poor health three or more ADL limitations.
AHEAD measures cognitive status in a battery of questions which aim
to test a number of domains of cognition (Herzog and Wallace 1997).
Learning and memory are assessed by immediate and delayed recall from
a list of ten words that were read to the subject. Reasoning, orientation,
and attention are assessed from Serial 7’s, counting backward by one, and
the naming of public ﬁgures, dates, and objects.2 In prior work we have
found that unrealistic stated subjective survival probabilities are associ-
ated with low cognitive performance (Hurd, McFadden, and Gan 1998).
Therefore we aggregated the cognitive measures in AHEAD and formed
ac a tegorical variable to indicate low cognitive performance.
AHEAD also has a battery of questions that are extracted from the
Center for Epidemiologic Studies (CESD) scale, which aims to assess de-
pressed mood. We form an indicator of depressed mood based on these
questions.
5.3 Results
Theb aseline AHEAD sample was 8,222, of which 813 died between
waves1a nd 2, and 7,364 survived; the vital status of 45 is unknown. Ex-
cluding those forty-ﬁve, the two-year mortality rate was 0.099.3 This mor-
tality rate cannot be compared with any lifetable rate for two reasons:
2. “Serial 7’s” asks the subject to subtract 7 from 100, and then to continue subtracting 7
from each successive diﬀerence for a total of ﬁve subtractions.
3. The mortality rate including the 45 cases among the living was 0.0988. Including them
among the dead, the mortality rate was 0.104. In the rest of the paper we will include them
among the living for convenience, but their treatment is not consequential compared with
the lack of data on the institutionalized population.
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it excludes residents of long-term care facilities who have substantially
higher mortality rates than the community-based population. Lifetables
include residents of long-term care facilities and of other institutions.4 Sec-
ond, the AHEAD sample includes spouses of AHEAD age-eligible re-
spondents, but the spouses may themselves not be age eligible. The age-
ineligible spouses do not make up any population whose mortality rate can
be compared with a lifetable.
Them o rtality rate of the AHEAD age-eligible sample (N  7,446) was
0.107; the lifetable rate interpolated to 1993 was 0.155. The diﬀerence
comes from the high mortality rates among the institutionalized.
Table 5.1 shows weighted mortality rates for the age-eligible part of the
AHEAD population by age and sex, and the number of observations. A
fewr e spondents were aged sixty-nine at their initial interviews but we in-
clude them in the seventy to seventy-four age band. The weights account
for the oversamples at baseline. The ﬁgures show sharply increasing mor-
tality rates with age and a considerable diﬀerence between men and
women. At older ages the number of subjects diminishes rapidly due to
mortality, cohort eﬀects, and the fact that the institutionalized are not in
the AHEAD baseline.
Table 5.2 presents mean wealth and income by age and marital status.
Wealth is the total of housing, ﬁnancial, and business and other real estate
wealth, but it does not include any pension wealth. Income includes all
ﬁnancial income such as pension income, but no ﬂow from owner-
occupied housing. Just as in other cross-sectional data sets, wealth and
income fall with age, and both are higher among couples than among
singles.T he table makes clear that we cannot study the relationship be-
tween mortality and economic statuswithout eﬀectively controlling for age.
Table 5.1 Two-Year Mortality Rates (weighted)
Male Female
N Mortality Rate N Mortality Rate
69–74 1,170 0.064 1,626 0.058
75–79 820 0.126 1,264 0.080
80–84 574 0.164 953 0.104
85–89 268 0.216 468 0.169
90 82 0.402 221 0.262
All 2,914 0.125 4,532 0.095
Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD waves 1 and 2.
4. Because AHEAD will follow the baseline respondents into institutions, it will eventually
be representative of the entire cohort of 1923 or earlier.
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Table 5.3 shows mean and median wealth in wave 1 by vital status in
wave 2. At baseline among single males aged seventy to seventy-four who
survived to wave 2, average wealth was about $216.5 thousand. Wealth
was just $67.2 thousand among those who died. This is, of course, a sub-
stantial diﬀerence and indicates considerable diﬀerential mortality by
wealth holdings. The diﬀerence among single females is smaller but still
substantial. Among married males there is only a small diﬀerence, whereas
married female survivors had almost twice the wealth on average as de-
ceased married females. The medians also indicate considerable diﬀeren-
tial mortality by wealth.
There is diminished diﬀerential mortality by wealth among those aged
seventy-ﬁve to seventy-nine. Given the amount of observation error on
wealth, we judge there to be little diﬀerence in wealth holdings by mortal-
ityo utcome among those married at baseline, either male or female. There
is some diﬀerence among singles. The diﬀerences are smaller still among
the eighty- to eighty-four-year-olds, and there are no consistent diﬀerences
among the eighty-ﬁve-to eighty-nine-year-olds. The medians show some-
what more diﬀerential mortality but not as much as at the youngest age in-
terval.
Among those aged ninety or over, sample sizes are small. For example,
only thirty-nine single males and twenty married females were in the age
interval at baseline. The group with the largest number of observations
(single females) shows no diﬀerential mortality.
These data are summarized in ﬁgure 5.1, which shows the wealth of
decedents relative to the wealth of survivors.5 For example, single female
decedents aged seventy to seventy-four had about 40 percent of the wealth
of survivors. The ﬁgure shows a general trend to smaller diﬀerences in
5. Not shown when the category has fewer than 100 observations.
Table 5.2 Mean Wealth and Income, Weighted (thousands)
Age
70–74 75–79 80–84 85–89 90
Wealth
Singles 141.6 113.0 91.4 86.6 77.2
Couples 269.3 243.1 204.7 187.9 86.1
Income
Singles 17.0 14.9 13.1 13.4 11.2
Couples 31.8 30.8 29.6 25.8 15.0
Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD wave 1.
Note: Forc o uples, “age” is the respondent’s age, “Wealth” is the wealth of the couple, and
“Income” is the income of the couple. Thus each couple enters the table twice.
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ential mortality by wealth: On average, those who died had about 70 per-
cent of the wealth of those who survived. However, the diﬀerence de-
creases with age.
Table 5.4 has comparable results but for average education. Thus,
among males aged seventy to seventy-four the average level of education
Table 5.3 Wealth at Baseline (thousands)
Vital Status in Wave 2
All Survived Died
NN Mean Median N Mean Median
Ages 70–74
Single
Male 250 228 216.5 69.8 22 67.2 20.4
Female 828 776 128.7 51.7 52 52.9 25.6
Married
Male 906 854 282.6 150.8 52 268.3 115.6
Female 777 737 260.3 140.6 40 138.6 100.8
Ages 75–79
Single
Male 204 176 176.7 68.3 28 129.9 96.0
Female 802 737 100.8 44.0 65 75.8 29.5
Married
Male 606 531 255.3 125.2 75 225.8 103.0
Female 445 410 232.5 117.0 35 214.8 80.0
Ages 80–84
Single
Male 160 126 111.0 52.0 34 106.0 48.0
Female 704 624 91.4 42.4 80 60.5 25.8
Married
Male 407 350 212.5 110.7 57 191.4 69.6
Female 244 225 201.2 113.3 19 144.6 95.5
Ages 85–89
Single
Male 106 84 111.9 35.8 22 75.8 11.0
Female 393 324 82.7 39.0 69 80.0 20.0
Married
Male 161 125 178.3 74.3 36 135.0 63.2
Female 73 64 225.3 79.0 9 260.2 72.0
Ages 90
Single
Male 39 23 205.2 25.9 16 65.7 26.2
Female 199 143 59.0 11.0 56 84.8 26.1
Married
Male 43 26 97.7 66.5 17 81.9 35.0
Female 20 18 83.4 78.5 2 29.4 47.3
Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD waves 1 and 2.
Predictors of Mortality among the Elderly 177was 11.5 years among survivors and 10.4 among the deceased. In the ﬁrst
age band the diﬀerential is considerable and it is the same for each sex.
At ages seventy-ﬁve to seventy-nine the diﬀerential decreases for men but
remains about the same for women, and by ages eighty to eighty-four there
is no diﬀerential among men. It is notable that in the highest age interval,
the educational level of women is higher than that of men even though for
these cohorts the educational level of a complete population of men would
have been considerably higher. An explanation is found in the diﬀerential
mortality at younger ages: Women consistently have a higher mortality
gradient by education than men, causing the better-educated women to
survive at a higher rate than the better-educated men.
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show mortality rates by wealth and income quartiles,
respectively. The quartiles are deﬁned separately by marital status, but the
quartile boundaries are the same over the entire age range. Because of
the correlations between age and economic status, and between age and
mortality, overall mortality varies strongly by wealth or income quartile as
shown in the last line of each table. However, this relationship is much less
clear when age is controlled for. In the ﬁrst age band there is a consistent
decline across the quartiles, but in the other age bands there is little con-
sistent pattern even though mortality is generally the largest in the lowest
wealth quartile. Mortality by income has a more consistent pattern and
for some age intervals the eﬀects are very strong. For example, among
eighty to eighty-four-year-olds the mortality rate in the lowest income
quartile is about 56 percent greater than in the highest. As with wealth,
however, the diﬀerential seems to diminish with age.
These ﬁgures, particularly for wealth, suggest that diﬀerential mortality
178 Michael D. Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and Angela Merrill










































































































































































































































































.may decrease with age. To test that idea we estimated analysis-of-variance
models in which the observations are mortality rates classiﬁed by age in-
tervals and income and wealth quartiles. The models had complete inter-
actions between age intervals and income quartiles and between age inter-
vals and wealth quartiles. We tested for signiﬁcance of the interactions.
We could reject the null hypothesis that the interactions for couples and
separately for singles are all zero at the 5 percent level, but not at the 1
percent level. Because the age interactions are not particularly strong and
in the interest of simplifying the analysis, our basic model will have age
eﬀects, and income and wealth quartiles but not interactions. We will leave
the exploration of the age interaction for future research.
Table 5.7 has mortality rates by education level for males. As the table
shows, in the AHEAD data mortality is higher for men with nine to eleven
yearso fe ducation than for males of zero to eight years of education, and
this is true holding age constant. We have no good reason for this result,
except possibly that those with zero to eight years of education have been
highly selected by the time they reach the AHEAD ages. Holding age con-
stant, we see some pattern of diﬀerential mortality in the younger age
bands, buti ti slessa pparent at older ages.
Table 5.6 Two-Year Mortality Rates: Income Quartiles
Income Quartile
Lowest 2nd 3rd Highest
70–74 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.05
75–79 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.09
80–84 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.09
85–89 0.25 0.17 0.13 0.16
90 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.28
All 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.08
Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD waves 1 and 2.
Table 5.5 Two-Year Mortality Rates: Wealth Quartiles
Wealth Quartile
Lowest 2nd 3rd Highest
70–74 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.04
75–79 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.09
80–84 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.11
85–89 0.23 0.18 0.16 0.16
90 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.37
All 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.08
Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD waves 1 and 2.
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tionship between mortality and education, but at older ages there is little
if any (table 5.8).
Overall we conclude that there is diﬀerential mortality by educational
attainment at the younger ages in the AHEAD population, but the eﬀects
diminish with age. Particularly among females, who comprise most of the
observations in the population aged eighty or over, there is little evidence
foram o rtality gradient by education.
5.3.2 Subjective Probabilities of Survival
The subjective probability of survival has been studied extensively in
data from the HRS (Hurd and McGarry 1995, forthcoming). In cross-
section it aggregates well to lifetable levels and it varies appropriately with
known risk factors. Furthermore, in panel it is a signiﬁcant predictor of ac-
tual mortality even after accounting for SES and a number of disease con-
ditions. In AHEAD baseline it aggregates well to lifetable values among
those aged seventy to seventy-nine, but in the older age groups the subjec-
tive survival probabilities overstate survival compared with lifetable rates
(Hurd, McFadden, and Gan 1998). One cause of the excess survival prob-
Table 5.8 Two-Year Mortality Rates: Education (females)
Years of Education
Age 0–8 9–111 21 2 
70–74 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.04
75–79 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.06
80–84 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.10
85–89 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.16
90 0.25 0.16 0.31 0.28
All 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.08
Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD waves 1 and 2.
Table 5.7 Two-Year Mortality Rates: Education (males)
Years of Education
Age 0–8 9–111 21 2 
70–74 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.04
75–79 0.12 0.19 0.08 0.13
80–84 0.15 0.26 0.20 0.11
85–89 0.25 0.28 0.10 0.15
90 0.43 0.48 0.42 0.37
All 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.09
Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD waves 1 and 2.
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surviving to the target age. The propensity to give a probability of 1.0 is re-
lated to low cognitive status, and often an individual will give a probability
of 1.0 to a number of unrelated subjective probability questions. Such reg-
ularities provide evidence of error in some of the responses. Nonetheless,
we will take the responses as they were given by the AHEAD subjects.
We imagine, however, that the predictive power of the subjective survival
probabilities could be increased were some of the reporting error removed
by application of a model of the error.
Table 5.9 shows the average subjective survival probability by age band
and wealth quartile.6 It is important to group by age in this manner be-
cause all the respondents in each age band were given the same target age.
As would be expected the average survival probability declines with age,
but unlike actual mortality there is little systematic variation in the sur-
vival probability as a function of wealth. For example, among those aged
seventyt os eventy-four the average subjective survival probability is about
the same in the lowest and the 3rd quartiles. Only in the highest quartile
is it greater. Yet the actual two-year survival rate was 5 percentage points
higher in the 4th quartile than in the 1st quartile: Such a large diﬀerence
in two-year survival should accumulate to a much greater diﬀerence in
subjective survival to the target age.
As shown in tables 5.10 and 5.11, there is little variation in the survival
probabilities as a function of either income quartiles or education bands,
respectively.
Ap ossibler easonf or the lack of any pattern by wealth, income, or
education is the rather high rate of nonresponse to the survival probabili-
ties.7 A substantial number of interviews were by proxy, often because of
6. Both the wealth and income quartiles are calculated separately by marital status.
7. This low response rate in AHEAD is in contrast to the very high response rate in HRS.
Table 5.9 Subjective Survival Probabilities: Wealth Quartiles (weighted)
Wealth Quartile
Lowest 2nd 3rd Highest
70–74 0.500 0.470 0.509 0.534
75–79 0.382 0.369 0.385 0.403
80–84 0.310 0.310 0.326 0.306
85–89 0.287 0.256 0.317 0.320
All 0.403 0.385 0.422 0.443
Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD wave 1.
Notes: Target ages for survival are 85 for the 70–74 age group; 90 for the 75–79 age group;
95 for the 80–84 age group; and 100 for the 85–89 age group. Survival probabilities are not
asked ofp e r s o n sa g e d9 0o ra b o v e .
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ap roxya bout the subject’s subjective survival probability. In addition, a
rather large number of respondents replied “Don’t know” (DK) to the
query. Table 5.12 has the counts of nonresponse as a function of wealth
quartile.O verall, about 25 percent of singles and 21 percent of married
persons were nonrespondents (not shown). It is clear that the rate of nonre-
sponsei sg reatesta mong those in the lowest quartiles. For example, among
seventy- to seventy-four-year-olds, the rate of nonresponse was about 31
percent in the lowest quartile and 11 percent in the highest. Furthermore,
because the propensity to give a proxy interview and the likelihood of a
DK response are related to health status, it is probable that the responding
sample is systematically selected toward those with higher survival proba-
bilities. Therefore, the averages in the lowest quartiles are higher than the
true quartile averages whereas the averages in the highest quartiles are
closer to the true averages, acting to reduce any upward trend in the sub-
jective survival probabilities as a function of wealth.
We ask whether the pattern of nonresponse could conceivably be re-
sponsible for the lack of pattern in the subjective survival probabilities,
even though there is a clear pattern in actual mortality. We illustrate that
it could be responsible by assigning a subjective survival probability of
Table 5.11 Subjective Survival Probabilities: Education (weighted)
Years of Education
0–8 9–11 12 12
70–74 0.494 0.508 0.491 0.532
75–79 0.341 0.388 0.384 0.417
80–84 0.308 0.338 0.274 0.340
85–89 0.354 0.241 0.308 0.258
All 0.382 0.411 0.413 0.442
Note: See table 5.9 for source and notes.
Table 5.10 Subjective Survival Probabilities: Income Quartiles (weighted)
Income Quartile
Lowest 2nd 3rd Highest
70–74 0.483 0.488 0.492 0.545
75–79 0.348 0.376 0.387 0.415
80–84 0.324 0.331 0.281 0.319
85–89 0.277 0.289 0.333 0.278
All 0.382 0.404 0.410 0.451
Note: See table 5.9 for source and notes.
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Wealth Quartile
Lowest 2nd 3rd Highest
70–74
Don’t know 107 51 52 45
Refused 16 10 11 3
Proxy 62 47 54 39
Other 1 1 1 0
75–79
Don’t know 76 57 45 40
Refused 17 13 10 15
Proxy 67 48 38 31
Other 0 0 0 1
80–84
Don’t know 75 44 46 23
Refused 22 28 12 5
Proxy 75 44 36 24
Other 1 0 0 1
85–89
Don’t know 44 18 14 17
Refused 10 7 5 5
Proxy 55 18 23 15
Other 0 0 0 0
90 120 77 62 42
Total missing 748 463 409 306
Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD wave 1.
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zero to the nonresponders. Figure 5.2 shows the variation in the subjective
survival probabilities under that assignment. The probabilities increase in
wealth in each age band. These results show that diﬀerential nonresponse
has a quantitatively important eﬀecto nthe level and variation in the sub-
jective survival probabilities. In future work we will explore methods for
imputing missing values, but for the rest of this paper we will, as appro-
priate, use categorical variables to account for nonresponse.
Table 5.13 shows the estimated regressions of the subjective survival
probabilities on the wealth and income quartiles, education bands, and
other explanatory variables. We control for age and for the varying interval
between the interview and the target age by including as a right-hand vari-
able the lifetable survival rate to the target age from the age of the respon-
dent. If respondents reported their subjective survival probability to be
the same as the lifetable rate, the coeﬃciento nthis variable would be
1.0. The estimated coeﬃcient shows that the age gradient in the subjective
survival probability is less than the age gradient in the lifetable rate. This
is partly due to the overestimation of subjective survival probabilities
among the oldest compared with the lifetable values.The three sets of SES variables show no systematic pattern, which is the
basicﬁ n ding from the cross-tabulations in tables 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11. Rela-
tive to the lifetable, males overstate their survival chances by 0.07. This
tendency toward over-optimism is also found in the HRS population
(Hurd and McGarry 1995).
The last two columns of table 5.13 contain regressions that include con-
trols for health condition. Most of the health conditions are asked of the
respondent in the following form: “Has a doctor ever told you that you
have . . . ?” The exceptions are “low cognitive score,” which is a categorical
variable indicating a low score on the sum of three items that were admin-
istered in the survey itself; and “Depression” (CESD8), which is based on
eight items from the CESD (Wallace and Herzog 1995). A categorical
variable for depression indicates a score of 5 or more on the CESD. Eight
of the thirteen health variables are signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, and they
are associated with a reduction in the subjective survival probabilities of
9–25 percent of the average probability. For example, having had heart
disease of a heart attack prior to wave 1 is associated with a reduction in
the subjective survival probability of 0.062 from a base of 0.415, or about
15 percent. Based on these results we would expect the subjective survival
probabilities to predict actual mortality because of their association with
the health conditions that, themselves, are associated with mortality.
5.3.3 Change in the Subjective Survival Probabilities
As individuals age the subjective survival probabilities should increase
among survivors holding the target age constant. Between waves 1 and 2
Predictors of Mortality among the Elderly 185
Fig. 5.2 Subjective survival probabilities (all)the average increase was 0.064 (16 percent) among singles and 0.051 (15
percent) among couples. Tables 5.14 and 5.15 show the levels and changes
by ageb and and by sex. The tables show that the subjective survival prob-
abilities are overstated relative to lifetables at older ages, particularly
among men. For example, among men aged eighty-ﬁve to eighty-nine the
Table 5.13 Determinants of Subjective Survival Probabilities (average
probability  0.415)
R2  0.06 R2  0.10
Coeﬃcient t-statistic Coeﬃcient t-statistic
Intercept 0.206 11.819 0.330 14.855
Wealth quartiles
Lowest — — — —
2nd 0.028 2.029 0.045 3.247
3rd 0.009 0.617 0.030 2.062
Highest 0.007 0.465 0.030 1.921
Income quartiles
Lowest — — — —
2nd 0.020 1.447 0.013 0.988
3rd 0.011 0.765 0.000 0.022
Highest 0.033 2.006 0.023 1.382
Years ofe d u c a t ion
0–8 — ———
9–11 0.001 0.090 0.006 0.417
12 0.019 1.369 0.029 2.049
12 0.012 0.828 0.004 0.259
Lifetime survival to target age 0.516 17.796 0.499 17.097
Male 0.072 4.330 0.070 4.253
Married 0.006 0.475 0.020 1.630
Married male 0.014 0.659 0.017 0.832
Health conditions
Heart disease/attack 0.062 6.214
Cancer 0.049 3.748
Stroke 0.000 0.022
High blood pressure 0.037 4.037
Diabetes 0.036 2.612
Lung disease 0.079 5.665
Arthritis 0.037 3.444
Incontinence 0.020 1.705
Hip fracture 0.044 1.894
Fall requiring treatment 0.022 1.227
Low cognitive score 0.018 1.569
ADL limitation (2) 0.060 3.040
Depression (CESD8 4) 0.103 6.676
Missing cognition 0.019 0.571
Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD wave 1.
Notes: Based on OLS estimation. ADL  activities of daily living; CESD8  depression
subtest of the Center for Epidemiologic Studies (CESD). Subjective survival probabilities
are not asked of personsa g e d9 0o ra b o v e .N  5,440.
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average lifetable value is 0.034. In terms of relative risk, the increases in the
subjective survival probabilities from wave to wave are reasonably close to
the increases in the lifetable probabilities except in the oldest age intervals.
Although it is diﬃcult to know what the appropriate standard of compari-
soni s, it is notable that in all age bands the subjective survival probabilities
increase between the waves. This increase was not found in HRS: Among
survivors, the average subjective survival probability decreased slightly
(Hurd and McGarry forthcoming).
Besides increases in the subjective survival probabilities that are due to
the AHEAD subjects’ surviving for two years, the probabilities should
change in response to new information that alters survival chances. Such
information would be onset of a health condition that is associated with an
increased risk of death. Table 5.16 shows the incidence of new conditions
between waves1and2for all respondents.T hus, for example, among
singles whoh ad noth ad cancer prior to the baseline interview, 5.1 percent
hadac ancer between the waves. Among all singles, including those with
Table 5.15 Change in Subjective Survival Probabilities and Lifetable Rates,
Wave1t o2(females)
Subjective Survival to Target Age Lifetable Survival to Target Age
Percent Percent
Wave 1W ave2 Change Wave 1 Wave 2 Change
70–74 0.510 0.558 9.4 0.575 0.605 5.2
75–79 0.388 0.469 20.9 0.399 0.432 8.3
80–84 0.303 0.399 31.7 0.200 0.228 14.0
85–89 0.299 0.376 25.8 0.074 0.091 23.0
Note: See table 5.14 for source and notes.
Table 5.14 Change in Subjective Survival Probabilities and Lifetable Rates,
Wave1t o2(males)
Subjective Survival to Target Age Lifetable Survival to Target Age
Percent Percent
Wave 1W ave2 Change Wave 1 Wave 2 Change
70–74 0.508 0.548 7.9 0.389 0.423 8.7
75–79 0.382 0.470 23.0 0.226 0.259 14.6
80–84 0.332 0.396 19.3 0.098 0.121 23.5
85–89 0.314 0.345 9.9 0.034 0.048 41.2
Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD waves 1 and 2.
Notes: Target ages for survival are 85 for the 70–74 age group; 90 for the 75–79 age group;
95 for the 80–84 age group; and 100 for the 85–89 age group. Survival probabilities are not
asked ofp e r s o n sa g e d9 0o ra b o v e .
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between the waves. Although it is not the focus of this paper, the table
shows that having a prior history of cancer, stroke, heart attack/disease,
hip fracture, or fall increases the risk of a new, similar event. Having a low
cognitive score, which is associated with increased risk of dementia, has
the greatest rate of onset.
About 8.2 percent of singles who were living in the community at wave
1w e r ei nan u r s i n gh o m ea tw a v e2 .
There is little diﬀerence in the rates of onset between singles and couples
except for limitations on the activities of daily living (ADL limitations)
and nursing home entry. The measure of ADL limitations is an indicator
for ADL limitations greater than two, and singles had an incidence rate of
Table 5.16 Incidence of Conditions between AHEAD Waves 1 and 2
Singles Married
(N  3,410) (N  3,496)
N at risk Rate N at risk Rate
Onset between waves 1 and 2
Cancer 2,940 5.14 3,009 5.08
Cancer (including repeat cancer) 3,410 5.45 3,496 5.78
Stroke 3,095 4.78 3,214 4.54
Stroke (including repeat stroke) 3,410 5.81 3,496 5.49
Heart attack or disease 2,335 10.00 2,402 9.00
Heart attack or disease (including repeat
attack) 3,410 13.96 3,496 12.04
High blood pressurea 1,430 12.03 1,693 9.27
Diabetesa 2,621 3.17 2,787 2.54
Lung disease 3,024 2.91 3,113 2.67
Arthritisa 2,113 17.13 2,460 13.74
Incontinencea 2,355 14.06 2,660 12.11
Hip fracture 3,190 2.70 3,379 1.10
Hip fracture (including repeat fracture) 3,410 3.05 3,496 1.37
Fall requiring treatment 3,099 12.62 3,278 9.37
Fall requiring treatment (including
repeat fall) 3,410 14.81 3,496 10.76
Low cognitive scoreb 1,927 29.58 2,408 24.29
ADL limitations  2 2,969 10.44 3,215 6.56
Depression (CESD8)c 2,667 6.11 2,847 4.95
Living in a nursing home wave 2 3,410 8.18 3,496 3.66
Spouse died — — 3,496 7.87
Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD waves 1 and 2.
Notes: Sample includes all persons with a wave 1 and a wave 2 interview (including proxy
and exit proxy interviews for the deceased).
aCondition not asked in exit proxy. Incidence may be underestimate, because it includes as
at-risk those who died.
bScore of 15 or less on AHEAD cognitive battery questions.
cCESD8 score greater than 4; self-respondents only, N  3,105 for singles and N  3,096
for married.
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comes from the fact that (on average) singles are older than couples, and
from the ability of couples to help each other, disguising some mild cases
of ADL limitations. As in the case of ADL limitations, the rate of entry
into an ursingh omei sg reater among singles because of age diﬀerences
and because a spouse can provide help that will keep the other spouse in
the community.
Table 5.17 shows the estimated regression of the change in the subjective
survival probabilities between waves 1 and 2 on the incidence of health
conditions and other events.8 To the extent that the onset of a new condi-
tion provides new information about survival chances, onset should reduce
the subjective survival probabilities. A number of the conditions have neg-
ative coeﬃcients indicating that onset reduces the subjective survival prob-
abilities, and cancer, high blood pressure, diabetes, and depression have
negative eﬀects that are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The depression
indicator is somewhat diﬀerent from the other health condition indicators
in that it probably depends on the same or similar aspects of health as
8. For heart attack, cancer, and stroke, those with a history of the condition at baseline
and who had a new incident between waves 1 and 2 are included as incident cases.





Married male 0.030 1.273
Incidence of health conditions
Heart disease/attack 0.000 0.021
Cancer 0.063 2.328
Stroke 0.025 0.799
High blood pressure 0.053 2.249
Diabetes 0.083 2.478
Lung disease 0.066 1.840
Arthritis 0.016 0.965
Incontinence 0.020 1.133
Hip fracture 0.007 0.136
Fall requiring treatment 0.010 0.486
Low cognitive score 0.004 0.256
ADL limitations  2 0.067 2.238
Depression 0.061 2.504
Spouse died 0.054 2.001
Entered nursing home 0.017 0.311
Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD waves 1 and 2.
Notes: Change in the subjective survival probability is wave 2 report minus wave 1 report.
Incidence of heart attack, cancer, and stroke includes new incidents among those with a prior
history. Survival probabilities not asked of persons aged 90 or above. N  4,061. R2  0.005.
Predictors of Mortality among the Elderly 189the subjective survival probabilities.9 Thed eath of a spouse increased the
subjective survival probabilities. In the HRS, the death of a spouse de-
creased subjective survival probabilities (Hurd and McGarry forthcom-
ing). An explanation for the diﬀerence may be that at the ages of the
AHEAD respondents the death of a spouse is preceded by a period of
care that reduces the optimism of the caregiver.
Theo nset of ADL limitations of 3 or more increased subjective survival
probabilities. Because there is no obvious reason for this result, we per-
formed somee stimations with more detail. First, the increase is found in
detailed regressions for singles and couples separately. Second, we deﬁned
some additional categories for change in ADL limitations and estimated
their eﬀects. The categories were (1) no baseline ADL limitation and one
or more ADL limitations in wave 2; (2) one or more ADL limitations in
baseline and an increase in limitations by wave 2; and (3) one or more
ADL limitations in baseline and no increase by wave 2. For category (1),
whichi so nset of any ADL limitation, the eﬀecti st or educe the subjective
survival probability by a small amount (0.014, not signiﬁcant). For cate-
gory (2), the eﬀecti st oincrease the subjective survival probability by
0.054 (p-value of 0.045), and for category (3) it is to increase the subjective
survival probability by 0.040 (p-value of 0.109). Thus the increase in the
subjective survival probability accompanying the onset of three or more
ADL limitations is due to those who had existing baseline ADL limita-
tionsr eporting higher probabilities in wave 2. We have no explanation for
this increase.
5.3.4 Subjective Survival Probabilities and Mortality
As discussed earlier, the rate of response about subjective survival prob-
abilities was rather low in AHEAD, and actual mortality between waves
1a nd 2w as abovea verage among the nonresponders. As shown in the last
row of table 5.18, the overall mortality rate among the 7,446 age-eligible
subjects in wave 1 was 10.6 percent. The other rows show mortality rates
among those who did not answer the question about subjective survival
probabilities. These nonrespondents are divided according to reason for
nonresponse. The ﬁrst row shows the mortality rate among those who were
aged ninety or over at wave 1: By survey design, they were not asked the
question about subjective survival, and their two-year mortality rate was
about 0.30. Those who answered DK (don’t know) had approximately av-
erage mortality rates, whereas those who refused to answer (RF) had
somewhat elevated mortality rates. A large group (685) were interviewed
by proxy in wave 1, and they had a substantially higher mortality rate than
average. A main reason for interview by proxy was that the subject was
9. The depression indicator takes the value 1 if the sum of the eight items on the CESD8
is greater than 4.
190 Michael D. Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and Angela Merrilltoof r ail or cognitively impaired to be interviewed. This frailty is reﬂected
in the mortality rate.
Table 5.19 has mortality rates by subjective survival probability in wave
1. The table shows that the subjective survival probabilities have consider-
able explanatory power for mortality, particularly in the low range. Thus,
fore xample, the mortality rate among those who gave a zero probability
of survival was about 0.13 compared with about 0.05 among those who
gave a 0.50 probability of survival. The mortality rates are basically ﬂat in
the interval from 0.21 to 0.90. This is similar to the relationship found be-
tween the subjective survival probabilities and mortality in the HRS (Hurd
and McGarry forthcoming). The increase in mortality at the two highest
probability intervals indicates observation error that is likely related to
misunderstanding or cognitive malfunctioning.
More detailed cross-tabulations of the correlates of mortality are not
practical, so we turn to data-descriptive Probit estimation as a way to re-
duce the dimensionality of the predictors. Table 5.20 has the results from
Table 5.19 Two-Year Mortality Rates
Subjective












Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD waves 1 and 2.









Responders and nonresponders 0.106 7,446
Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD waves 1 and 2.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Probit estimation of the determinants of mortality. The left-hand variable
takes the value of 1 if a subject died between the waves and zero otherwise.
We control for age and sex by including as a right-hand variable the two-
year mortality rate by age and sex from an interpolated 1993 lifetable.
Thus, the other right-hand variables will show the deviation in mortality
rates from the lifetable rate. The Probit coeﬃcients have been translated






where  is the Probit coeﬃcientonx and  is the normal density evaluated
at the average mortality rate of singles.10
Thet able has three sets of results depending on which variables are
included. In each set the ﬁrst column has the eﬀects and the second the
statistic for testing the null hypotheses that the eﬀect is zero. Approxi-
mately, a statistic of 2.0 indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
The ﬁrst entry in the table is the coeﬃcient on two-year, age- and sex-
speciﬁc mortality rates from a 1993 interpolated lifetable. The coeﬃcient
is less than 1.0, reﬂecting the fact that in AHEAD mortality does not in-
crease with age as rapidly as the lifetable mortality. The diﬀerence in mor-
tality is partly due to the increasing fraction of the population that is insti-
tutionalized at greater ages. In that this part of the population is missing
from AHEAD, mortality rates in AHEAD will be progressively lower than
lifetable mortality rates, which reﬂect the entire population. An additional
factor could be that AHEAD is a more accurate measure of current mor-
tality than the lifetables that we use.11
In the ﬁrst column of table 5.20 mortality does systematically decrease
in wealth in approximately the same way as in the cross-tabulations in
table 5.5, but the coeﬃciento njust one of the wealth quartiles is signiﬁ-
cant at the 5 percent level. Mortality is generally lower in the higher-
income quartiles. The eﬀecto fe ducation is partly obscured by the higher
mortality rate in the second education band compared with the ﬁrst, but
moving from the second to the fourth education band reduces mortality
by 0.039 (p-value of 0.054).
Them o rtality rate of men was about 0.022 greater than would be pre-
dicted from the lifetable.12 Married respondents had mortality rates that
10. We will use the word “eﬀects” when we refer to the probability coeﬃcients. Wer e c o g -
nize that while they describe systematic relationships in the data they do not necessarily
measure causal relationships. It would require considerably more investigation to ascribe
causality.
11. To test whether our single lifetable mortality rate was adequately controlling for age
we also added ﬁve age intervals (not shown). None was signiﬁcant and all were small. We
conclude that there is no requirement for age indicators when the age- and sex-speciﬁc life-
table mortality rates are used.
12. Separate estimation of the mortality probit by sex shows that the coeﬃciento n“life-
table” is diﬀerent for male and female.
194 Michael D. Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and Angela Merrillwere about 0.023 lower than singles: This is a substantial reduction
amounting to about 21 percent of average mortality. There was no diﬀer-
ential eﬀect of marital status for men compared with women. That is, mar-
riaged oes not provide additional mortality protection for men relative to
women.13
Then ext two columns show the eﬀects when the subjective survival
probability is added along with a set of variables to account for missing
observations on the subjective survival probability. We entered the subjec-
tive survival probability as a deviation from the lifetable survival rate to
the target age. We did this because of the varying time interval between
the age of the subject and the target age. This formulation also automati-
cally scales for the fact that the eﬀecto nt w o-year mortality of a survival
probability to an age eleven to ﬁfteen years in the future will vary with
baseline age.
When the subjective survival probability is added, both the wealth and
income eﬀects are reduced and they are no longer statistically signiﬁcant.
The eﬀecto fe ducation as measured by the diﬀerence between the second
and fourth bands remains substantial and the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant. The
subjective survival probability is itself a powerful predictor of mortality:
Varying the subjective survival probability from zero to 1 would reduce
two-year mortality risk by 0.079, or 74 percent. The indicator variable for
proxy interview predicts much higher mortality.
The last two columns have Probit results when the baseline health con-
ditions are included. Of the thirteen health conditions, ten are signiﬁcant
at the 5 percent level, and each acts to increase mortality risk with the
eﬀects varying from 16 to 66 percent. Adding the health variables reduces
the eﬀecto fthe subjective survival probability by 33 percent, but it is still
substantial. The eﬀecto faproxy interview is reduced, as would be ex-
pected because proxy interviews are often due to poor health. Those with
low cognitive score at baseline had elevated mortality rates.14
In additional estimations which we do not report here, we estimated
separate mortality Probit models for males and for females. Our objective
wast ol earn whether there were substantial diﬀerences in the eﬀects of
SES or health conditions on mortality. In general there were few diﬀer-
ences: As in the pooled results, no income or wealth quartile had a sizable
eﬀect, nor was any signiﬁcant. However, the education gradient between
the second and fourth age bands, which we found in the pooled estimation,
wasf ound only in the results for men. The eﬀect ofm a r i tal status was
somewhat greater for men than for women, reducing the mortality rate by
0.032 compared with 0.015. In terms of relative risk, the reduction in risk
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13. See Lillard and Waite (1994) for the opposite ﬁnding.
14. We interacted low cognitive status with the subjective survival probability. The interac-
tion did have a positive sign, indicating that among those with low cognitive status the subjec-
tive survival probability is less predictive of mortality, but the eﬀectw as small and not sig-
niﬁcant (not shown).for men was2 6p e r c e n ta n df o rw o m e ni tw a s1 6p e r c e n t .T h ee ﬀects of
health conditions were about the same for men and women.
5.4 Conclusion
We found that, as in other data, mortality is related to SES. The relation-
ship is strong at younger ages in AHEAD and appears to weaken at older
ages.A ny explanation at this point would be rather speculative, but the
ﬁnding is consistent with the view that the primary cause of the gradient
is unobserved individual characteristics that cause bad health and there-
fore early death, and that cause lower earnings and therefore lower wealth
and less education. Were the causality to run primarily from economic
resources to health and mortality, we should see a persistent diﬀerence in
mortality outcomes in very old age between those with substantial re-
sources and those with few. We tentatively conclude that we do not see this,
although we acknowledge this should be conﬁrmed by further analysis. If
the diﬀerential is due to unobserved individual diﬀerences, the mortality
gradient operating at younger ages will have truncated the distribution, so
that in extreme old age the variation in individual characteristics would be
greatly reduced. Therefore, classifying people by SES would not produce
any substantial diﬀerences in mortality.
In cross-section, the subjective survival probability is related to baseline
health conditions, and there is some consistency in the relative importance
of the health conditions on the subjective survival probability and in their
importance in predicting actual mortality. For example, of the ﬁve largest
health eﬀects on the subjective survival probability, three are among the
ﬁve largest predictors of mortality (cancer, lung disease, and ADL limita-
tions  2). In panel, the subjective survival probability increases among
survivors, and the eﬀects of new health conditions on the panel change in
the subjective survival probabilities are similar to the cross-sectional
eﬀects of baseline health conditions. For example, of the ﬁve largest eﬀects
of the onset of health conditions on changes in the subjective survival
probability, three are among the ﬁve largest cross-sectional eﬀects (cancer,
lung disease, and depression).
The subjective survival probability predicts actual mortality as in the
HRS, which should increase our conﬁdence that it can be used to con-
struct individualized lifetables for models of life-cycle saving behavior as
proposed by Hurd, McFadden, and Gan (1998). Whether such lifetables
will have substantial explanatory power for saving remains to be deter-
mined as more waves of AHEAD become available.
Ther elationship between SES and mortality that is found in cross-
tabulations (as in table 5.5) disappears when health status is controlled for
(as in table 5.20). This result suggests that any diﬀerential access to health
care services related to SES is small. Were that not the case, in a popula-
tion with homogeneous baseline health (or with eﬀective controls for base-
196 Michael D. Hurd, Daniel McFadden, and Angela Merrillline health status) those with higher SES would be more likely to receive
appropriate treatment for the onset of a severe condition and, therefore, to
survive. We do not ﬁnd such a relationship. There could still be a role for
SES, however, through modiﬁcations in the probability of the onset of
health conditions, which, in turn, would aﬀectm o rtality risk. To assess
that path will require an additional dynamic model of health status.
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This paper is essentially a work-in-progress that to this point has shown
no surprises. Among the elderly, those who believe they are unhealthy seem
to be so, and those who haveas e rious condition that might be expected
to increase mortality appear to be at greater risk than those without such
conditions. Furthermore, as is true of all the comparisonsIhave seen,
health and wealth seem to be positively correlated. I really have only two
substantive comments and they are directed more toward work on data of
this sort than to this paper speciﬁcally.
First, in using the Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old
(AHEAD) survey, age and marital status cannot be treated blithely. This
has several facets. Because the AHEAD survey is community based and
excludes the institutionalized population, as age increases, members of the
survey become progressively more healthy in comparison to the overall
population of same-age and -sex individuals. Thus, one should be careful
in making statements such as: “The mortality gradient, whether a function
of wealth, income, or education, apparently decreases with age.” Next, the
age-ineligible members of AHEAD, by deﬁnition, are younger spouses of
age-eligible members of the survey. As such, they are more likely than
others of the same age to be healthy, and perhaps wealthy as well. Finally,
marital status per se is associated with health.
They oung and single, especially if never married, are less healthy. The
olda nd formerly married, whose spouses have been deceased for a con-
siderable period, as “survivors” may be more healthy than those whose
spouses have survived. This is, of course, pure speculation, but the point is
that in this sample, age and marital status—especially contemporary mar-
ital status without regard to marital history—should be handled with care.
Second, studies of mortality determinants among the elderly are likely
to yield counter-intuitive results that are easily misunderstood. Consider
at reatment, such as smoking, that increases mortality at relatively young
ages. Since people are heterogeneous, the treatment will aﬀect some more
than others. As the eﬀects of the treatment accrue, the most susceptible
succumb and the strong survive. When observing mortality only at ad-
vanced ages, after the most susceptible have been lost to the sample, we
should not be surprised to ﬁnd that the treatment seems to have little or
even perverse eﬀect.
We have all heard stories about those who claimed to have lived lives
from which few survived. Would we want to judge the eﬀects of such be-
havior only by observing the subsequent mortality of the—perhaps few—
hardy survivors?
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